Sentimentalizam i metafizička vjerovanja by Noriaki Iwasa
Prolegomena 9 (2) 2010: 271-286
Sentimentalism and Metaphysical Beliefs
NORIAKI IWASA
Independent Philosopher, Japan 
niwasa@uchicago.edu
ORIGINAL SCIENTIFIC ARTICLE / RECEIVED: 05–02–10 ACCEPTED: 15–08–10
ABSTRACT: This essay first introduces the moral sense theories of Francis Hutch-
eson, David Hume, and Adam Smith, and clarifies important differences between 
them. It then examines whether moral judgment based on the moral sense or 
moral sentiments varies according to one’s metaphysical beliefs. For this, the es-
say mainly applies those theories to such issues as stem cell research, abortion, 
and active euthanasia. In all three theories, false religious beliefs can distort moral 
judgment. In Hutcheson’s theory, answers to stem cell research, abortion, and ac-
tive euthanasia do not change according to the spectator’s metaphysical beliefs. 
Yet answers to those issues can change according to the agent’s metaphysical 
beliefs. Hume’s theory cannot provide answers to stem cell research and abortion 
where the embryo or fetus is the receiver (the one affected by the agent’s action) 
and to active euthanasia where the patient is unconscious. It may provide answers 
to abortion where the pregnant woman is the receiver and to active euthanasia 
where the patient is conscious. Yet the answers can vary depending on the wom-
an’s or the patient’s metaphysical beliefs. Smith’s theory can provide answers 
to stem cell research, abortion, and active euthanasia. But the answers can vary 
depending on the agent’s metaphysical beliefs. These show that the moral sense 
or moral sentiments in those theories alone cannot identify appropriate morals.
KEY WORDS: Abortion, active euthanasia, Hume, Hutcheson, moral judgment, mo-
ral sense, moral sentiment, religious belief, Smith, stem cell.
1. Introduction
In this essay, I first introduce the moral sense theories of Francis Hutch-
eson, David Hume, and Adam Smith, and clarify important differences be-
tween them. I then examine whether moral judgment based on the moral 
sense or moral sentiments varies according to one’s metaphysical beliefs, 
that is, religious, spiritual, or philosophical beliefs. For this, I mainly apply 
those theories to such issues as stem cell research, abortion, and active 
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euthanasia.1 The findings show that the moral sense or moral sentiments 
in those theories alone cannot identify appropriate morals.
2. Hutcheson’s Moral Theory
In An Essay on the Nature and Conduct of the Passions and Affections, 
Hutcheson defines sense as “every Determination of our Minds to receive 
Ideas independently on our Will, and to have Perceptions of Pleasure and 
Pain.” According to this definition, man has “many other Senses beside 
those commonly explained.” Hutcheson specifies the following senses: 
First, “the External Senses, universally known.” Second, “the Pleasant 
Perceptions arising from regular, harmonious, uniform Objects; as also 
from Grandeur and Novelty.” Third, “a Publick Sense, viz. ‘our Deter-
mination to be pleased with the Happiness of others, and to be uneasy at 
their Misery.’” Fourth, “the Moral Sense, by which ‘we perceive Virtue, or 
Vice in our selves, or others.’”2 Fifth, “a Sense of Honour, ‘which makes 
the Approbation, or Gratitude of others, for any good Actions we have 
done, the necessary occasion of Pleasure; and their Dislike, Condemna-
tion, or Resentment of Injuries done by us, the occasion of that uneasy 
Sensation called Shame, even when we fear no further evil from them.’” 
“There are perhaps other Perceptions distinct from all these Classes, such 
as some Ideas ‘of Decency, Dignity, Suitableness to human Nature in cer-
tain Actions and Circumstances; and of an Indecency, Meanness, and Un-
worthiness, in the contrary Actions or Circumstances, even without any 
conception of Moral Good, or Evil.’”3
Opposing moral rationalism, Hutcheson holds that moral distinc-
tions rest on the moral sense, by which we perceive moral good (virtue) 
or moral evil (vice) in actions. According to An Inquiry into the Original 
of Our Ideas of Beauty and Virtue, moral good “procures Approbation, 
and Love toward the Actor, from those who receive no Advantage by the 
Action.” On the other hand, moral evil “excites Aversion, and Dislike to-
ward the Actor, even from Persons unconcern’d in its natural Tendency.”4 
Moral approval or disapproval arises spontaneously. In Illustrations upon 
the Moral Sense, Hutcheson says, “Approbation is not what we can vol-
untarily bring upon our selves. When we are contemplating Actions, we 
1 In this essay, stem cell research refers to human embryonic stem cell research.
2 Hutcheson (2002: 17). Previous to Hutcheson, the third Earl of Shaftesbury used 
the term ‘moral sense’ in writing. Hutcheson borrows the term from him. See Shaftesbury 
(2001: II, 27). This essay does not discuss Shaftesbury’s moral sense theory because he 
does not much talk about the moral sense in his theory.
3 Hutcheson (2002: 18).
4 Hutcheson (2008: 85).
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do not chuse to approve, because Approbation is pleasant…Approbation 
is plainly a Perception arising without previous Volition, or Choice of it, 
because of any concomitant Pleasure.”5
Hutcheson distinguishes moral good and evil from natural ones.
How differently are they affected toward those they suppose possess’d of 
Honesty, Faith, Generosity, Kindness, even when they expect no Benefit 
from these admir’d Qualitys; and those who are possess’d of the natural 
Goods, such as Houses, Lands, Gardens, Vineyards, Health, Strength, Sa-
gacity? We shall find that we necessarily love and approve the Possessors 
of the former; but the Possession of the latter procures no Love at all toward 
the Possessor, but often contrary Affections of Envy and Hatred. In the same 
manner, whatever Quality we apprehend to be morally Evil, raises our Ha-
tred toward the Person in whom we observe it, such as Treachery, Cruelty, 
Ingratitude, even when they are no way hurtful to our selves; whereas we 
heartily love, esteem and pity many who are expos’d to natural Evils, such 
as Pain, Poverty, Hunger, Sickness, Death, even when we our selves suffer 
Inconveniencies, by these natural Evils of others.6
Hutcheson argues against such philosophers as Thomas Hobbes and 
Bernard Mandeville who hold that morality is reducible to self-love or 
self-interest. Hutcheson remarks, “Suppose we reap the same Advantage 
from two Men, one of whom serves us from Delight in our Happiness, and 
Love toward us; the other from Views of Self-Interest, or by Constraint: 
both are in this Case equally beneficial or advantageous to us, and yet we 
shall have quite different Sentiments of them.”7
Hutcheson thinks that we originally have “benevolent Affections…to-
ward others, in various Degrees, making us desire their Happiness as an 
ultimate End, without any view to private Happiness.”8 He says, “Desire 
of the Happiness of others which we account virtuous, is not directly ex-
cited by prospects of any secular Advantage, Wealth, Power, Pleasure of 
the external Senses, Reward from the Deity, or future Pleasures of Self-Ap-
probation.”9 Hutcheson regards “disinterested Affection” as an “Instinct, 
antecedent to all Reason from Interest.”10
Hutcheson regards “the universal Foundation of our Sense of moral 
Good, or Evil” as “Benevolence toward others on one hand, and Malice, 
or even Indolence, and Unconcernedness about the apparent publick Evil 
on the other.”11 In A System of Moral Philosophy, he writes,
 5 Hutcheson (2002: 155).
 6 Hutcheson (2008: 85–86).
 7 Hutcheson (2008: 90).
 8 Hutcheson (2002: 136).
 9 Hutcheson (2002: 24–25).
10 Hutcheson (2008: 112).
11 Hutcheson (2008: 120).
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The affections which excite this moral approbation are all either directly 
benevolent, or naturally connected with such dispositions; those which are 
disapproved and condemned, are either ill-natured, by which one is inclined 
to occasion misery to others; or such selfish dispositions as argue some un-
kind affection, or the want of that degree of the benevolent affections which 
is requisite for the publick good, and commonly expected in our species 
(SMP I.2.V).12
Hutcheson also says, “the most useful Action imaginable, loses all appear-
ance of Benevolence, as soon as we discern that it only flowed from Self-
Love or Interest.”13 In his view, “[t]he Actions which flow solely from 
Self-Love, and yet evidence no Want of Benevolence, having no hurtful 
Effects upon others, seem perfectly indifferent in a moral Sense.”14 Thus, 
what is important in morality is not an action itself but a disposition be-
hind the action.
In reality, the moral quality of actions is not always the same. To com-
pare the quality, Hutcheson introduces the following principle:
In comparing the moral Qualitys of Actions, in order to regulate our Election 
among various Actions propos’d, or to find which of them has the greatest 
moral Excellency, we are led by our moral Sense of Virtue to judge thus; 
that in equal Degrees of Happiness, expected to proceed from the Action, 
the Virtue is in proportion to the Number of Persons to whom the Happiness 
shall extend; (and here the Dignity, or moral Importance of Persons, may 
compensate Numbers) and in equal Numbers, the Virtue is as the Quantity 
of the Happiness, or natural Good; or that the Virtue is in a compound Ratio 
of the Quantity of Good, and Number of Enjoyers. In the same manner, the 
moral Evil, or Vice, is as the Degree of Misery, and Number of Sufferers; so 
that, that Action is best, which procures the greatest Happiness for the great-
est Numbers; and that, worst, which, in like manner, occasions Misery.
The phrase “the greatest Happiness for the greatest Numbers” precedes 
Jeremy Bentham’s similar and famous utilitarian phrase. Hutcheson’s 
utilitarianism is not just a mechanical calculation of effects. Hutcheson 
would disapprove of putting minority in grave misery for the benefit of the 
society as a whole. This is why he says, “the Dignity, or moral Importance 
of Persons, may compensate Numbers.”15
Hutcheson holds that “the Author of Nature [God]…has given us a 
Moral Sense, to direct our Actions, and to give us still nobler Pleasures.”16 
This implies that the moral sense is universal. In fact, Hutcheson remarks, 
12 Hutcheson (1755). The “I.2.V” refers to book 1, chapter 2, section 5.
13 Hutcheson (2008: 103).
14 Hutcheson (2008: 122).
15 Hutcheson (2008: 125).
16 Hutcheson (2008: 99).
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“’tis highly probable that the Senses of all Men are pretty uniform: That 
the Deity also approves kind Affections, otherwise he would not have 
implanted them in us, nor determined us by a moral Sense to approve 
them.”17
3. Hume’s Moral Theory
According to Hume, passions motivate actions, and “reason alone can 
never produce any action, or give rise to volition.” Reason is also “incapa-
ble of preventing volition, or of disputing the preference with any passion 
or emotion…Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, 
and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them” 
(T 2.3.3.4).18 In Hume’s view, reason can influence our action only in the 
following cases: “[e]ither when it excites a passion by informing us of the 
existence of something which is a proper object of it; or when it discovers 
the connexion of causes and effects, so as to afford us means of exerting 
any passion” (T 3.1.1.12).
Hume holds that passions cannot “be oppos’d by, or be contradictory 
to truth and reason.” The condition for something to be true or false is 
that it has “representative quality.” Something is true when it accurately 
represents an object; something is false when it fails to represent an object 
accurately. According to Hume, “[a] passion is an original existence, or, 
if you will, modification of existence, and contains not any representative 
quality, which renders it a copy of any other existence or modification” 
(T 2.3.3.5). Thus, Hume thinks that passions cannot be true or false. He 
also writes,
Reason is the discovery of truth or falshood. Truth or falshood consists in 
an agreement or disagreement either to the real relations of ideas, or to real 
existence and matter of fact. Whatever, therefore, is not susceptible of this 
agreement or disagreement, is incapable of being true or false, and can never 
be an object of our reason. Now ’tis evident our passions, volitions, and 
actions, are not susceptible of any such agreement or disagreement; being 
original facts and realities, compleat in themselves, and implying no refer-
ence to other passions, volitions, and actions. ’Tis impossible, therefore, they 
can be pronounc’d either true or false, and be either contrary or conformable 
to reason (T 3.1.1.9).
Hume says, “as nothing can be contrary to truth or reason, except what 
has a reference to it, and as the judgments of our understanding only have 
this reference, it must follow, that passions can be contrary to reason only 
17 Hutcheson (2002: 176).
18 Hume (2000). The “2.3.3.4” refers to book 2, part 3, section 3, paragraph 4.
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so far as they are accompany’d with some judgment or opinion.” Accord-
ing to Hume, passions can be unreasonable only in two senses. “First, 
When a passion, such as hope or fear, grief or joy, despair or security, is 
founded on the supposition or the existence of objects, which really do not 
exist. Secondly, When in exerting any passion in action, we choose means 
insufficient for the design’d end, and deceive ourselves in our judgment 
of causes and effects.” To sum up, “a passion must be accompany’d with 
some false judgment, in order to its being unreasonable; and even then ’tis 
not the passion, properly speaking, which is unreasonable, but the judg-
ment” (T 2.3.3.6).
Hume develops his moral theory mainly in book 3 of A Treatise of 
Human Nature and in An Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals. 
He claims that moral distinctions are not derived from reason but from 
a moral sense. Hume thinks “that moral distinctions depend entirely on 
certain peculiar sentiments of pain and pleasure, and that whatever men-
tal quality in ourselves or others gives us a satisfaction, by the survey or 
reflection, is of course virtuous; as every thing of this nature, that gives 
uneasiness, is vicious” (T 3.3.1.3). According to Hume, such a sentiment 
arises “only when a character is consider’d in general, without reference 
to our particular interest” (T 3.1.2.4).
Hume’s theory rests on a sequence of events involving an agent, re-
ceiver (the one affected by the agent’s action), and spectator.19 The agent’s 
mental quality – either virtuous or vicious one – motivates his action. Sup-
pose that the agent provides food for a starving person. In this case, the 
agent’s virtuous mental quality motivates the action. The action affects the 
receiver positively. The receiver feels pleasure by the action itself, and by 
the usefulness of the action such as health improvement. When the specta-
tor sees, hears, or imagines the receiver’s pleasure, the spectator also feels 
pleasure sympathetically. This sympathetic pleasure constitutes the spec-
tator’s moral approval of the action or the agent’s mental quality which 
motivated the action. The spectator thus regards it as virtuous. According 
to Hume, the spectator’s sympathetic pleasure arises from four types of 
the agent’s mental qualities. They are (1) mental qualities useful to others, 
(2) mental qualities useful to the agent himself, (3) mental qualities agree-
able to others, and (4) mental qualities agreeable to the agent himself (T 
3.3.1.30; EPM 9.1220).
In the Treatise, Hume distinguishes between artificial and natural vir-
tues. Artificial virtues “produce pleasure and approbation by means of an 
19 I use the word ‘receiver’ to explain Hume’s and Smith’s theories. But they never 
use the word in this sense.
20 Hume (1998a). The “9.12” refers to section 9, paragraph 12.
277N. IWASA: Sentimentalism and Metaphysical Beliefs
artifice or contrivance, which arises from the circumstances and neces-
sities of mankind” (T 3.2.1.1). Examples of artificial virtues are justice, 
promise-keeping, allegiance, treaty-keeping, and chastity. On the other 
hand, natural virtues “have no dependance on the artifice and contrivance 
of men” (T 3.3.1.1). Examples of natural virtues are “[m]eekness, benefi-
cence, charity, generosity, clemency, moderation, equity” (T 3.3.1.11).21
Finally, let us see moral disapproval of a vicious mental quality. Sup-
pose that the agent steals property from someone. This time, the agent’s 
vicious mental quality motivates the action. The action affects the receiver 
negatively. The receiver feels pain by the action itself, and by the incon-
venience the action produced. When the spectator sees, hears, or imagines 
the receiver’s pain, the spectator also feels pain sympathetically. This sym-
pathetic pain constitutes the spectator’s moral disapproval of the action or 
the agent’s mental quality which motivated the action. The spectator thus 
regards it as vicious.
4. Smith’s Moral Theory
As in Hume’s theory, sympathy plays an important role in Smith’s The 
Theory of Moral Sentiments. How does it work in Smith’s theory? He 
says, “As we have no immediate experience of what other men feel, we 
can form no idea of the manner in which they are affected, but by conceiv-
ing what we ourselves should feel in the like situation” (TMS I.i.1.2).22
Smith distinguishes between two types of moral judgments: judg-
ments of propriety and impropriety, and judgments of merit and demerit. 
The former consider an agent’s motives, while the latter consider a receiv-
er’s gratitude or resentment. “As our sense…of the propriety of conduct 
arises from…a direct sympathy with the affections and motives of the per-
son who acts, so our sense of its merit arises from…an indirect sympathy 
with the gratitude of the person who is…acted upon” (TMS II.i.5.1). “In 
the same manner as our sense of the impropriety of conduct arises from a 
want of sympathy, or from a direct antipathy to the affections and motives 
of the agent, so our sense of its demerit arises from…an indirect sympathy 
with the resentment of the sufferer” (TMS II.i.5.4).
On the conduct of another, we make a moral judgment by putting 
ourselves in his position. “We either approve or disapprove of the conduct 
of another man according as we feel that, when we bring his case home to 
21 The distinction between artificial and natural virtues in the Treatise almost disap-
pears from the Enquiry. The word ‘artificial’ relevant to virtues appears only once in the 
Enquiry (EPM App. 3.9n).
22 Smith (1982). The “I.i.1.2” refers to part 1, section 1, chapter 1, paragraph 2.
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ourselves, we either can or cannot entirely sympathize with the sentiments 
and motives which directed it” (TMS III.1.2).
On our own conduct, we make a moral judgment in the following 
way: “We endeavour to examine our own conduct as we imagine any other 
fair and impartial spectator would examine it. If, upon placing ourselves in 
his situation, we thoroughly enter into all the passions and motives which 
influenced it, we approve of it, by sympathy with the approbation of this 
supposed equitable judge. If otherwise, we enter into his disapprobation, 
and condemn it” (TMS III.1.2). Smith identifies “the supposed impartial 
and well-informed spectator” with conscience (TMS III.2.32).
5. Important Differences between the Theories
Although those three theories agree in that moral distinctions are not de-
rived from reason but from feelings, there are important differences be-
tween them. First, Hutcheson holds that we perceive moral good (virtue) 
or moral evil (vice) in actions by the moral sense, which is an extra sense 
beyond the five senses. Smith rejects the idea of the moral sense. He intro-
duces the idea of moral sentiments, which arise from sympathy with, want 
of sympathy with, or antipathy to the agent’s motives, sympathy with the 
receiver’s gratitude or resentment, and so on. Hume uses both the terms 
‘moral sense’ and ‘moral sentiment.’ In his theory, they are almost syn-
onymous. They arise from sympathy with the receiver’s feelings toward 
an action itself and its effects.
Second, there are two objects of focus in sentimentalism: an agent’s 
motives and the effects of his action. In Hutcheson’s theory, what is impor-
tant in morality is not an action itself but a disposition behind the action. 
Thus, the agent’s motives matter. To compare the moral quality of actions, 
Hutcheson also introduces the utilitarian principle, which considers the 
effects of actions. Yet the agent’s motives have priority over the effects 
of his action in moral judgment. According to Hume, moral approval or 
disapproval arises from the spectator’s sympathizing with the receiver’s 
feelings toward an action itself and its effects. The action itself, in Hume’s 
view, embodies the agent’s mental quality. Thus, Hume’s theory consid-
ers both the agent’s motives and the effects of his action. Smith holds that 
moral approval or disapproval arises from our or the impartial spectator’s 
sympathizing or not sympathizing with the agent’s passions and motives 
behind his action. As we saw, Smith’s theory features not only judgments 
of propriety and impropriety, but judgments of merit and demerit. While 
the former rest on “a direct sympathy with,” “a want of sympathy, or…a 
direct antipathy to the affections and motives of the agent,” the latter rest 
on “an indirect sympathy with the gratitude” or resentment of the receiver 
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(TMS II.i.5.1, 4; italics mine). According to Smith, “we cannot indeed 
enter thoroughly into the gratitude” or resentment of the receiver, “unless 
we beforehand approve” or disapprove “the motives of the agent” (TMS 
II.i.5.2, 5). This is because the agent’s motives may not be approvable 
while the receiver feels gratitude, or may not be disapprovable while the 
receiver feels resentment. Considering these, in Smith’s view, the agent’s 
motives have priority over the effects of his action. In reality, one cannot 
always clearly distinguish between the agent’s motives and the effects of 
his action. D. D. Raphael says, “A person’s intention in doing an action 
goes well beyond the purely physical movement initiated: it has an aim, to 
bring about some effect or effects of the physical movement.”23 Achiev-
ing some effect can be a motive for an action. While Raphael only talks 
about physical actions, the same applies to mental actions like praying for 
others’ happiness. Not every motive for an action has an aim because it 
is possible to do an action without purpose or without considering its ef-
fects.24 But the possible effects of an action at least sometimes shape or 
influence one’s passions and motives for the action.25
6. Metaphysical Beliefs and Moral Judgment
This section examines whether moral judgment based on the moral sense 
or moral sentiments varies according to one’s metaphysical beliefs, that 
is, religious, spiritual, or philosophical beliefs. For this, I mainly apply 
the three theories to such issues as stem cell research, abortion, and active 
euthanasia. I choose these issues for the following reasons: First, there 
has been little effort to apply the theories to those issues. Second, one’s 
metaphysical beliefs seem decisive for his moral judgments in those is-
sues. There are different kinds of metaphysical beliefs. Some of them are 
against stem cell research, abortion, or active euthanasia, while others, 
including atheistic ones, are not. Unless otherwise specified, metaphysical 
beliefs mentioned in this essay include both kinds.
Hutcheson holds that “the Author of Nature [God]…has given us a 
Moral Sense, to direct our Actions, and to give us still nobler Pleasures.”26 
Hutcheson’s following statements express similar ideas: “[O]ur Senses or 
Desires…are fixed for us by the Author of our Nature, subservient to the 
Interest of the System.”27 “[W]e entirely depend on God;…all the goods 
23 Raphael (2007: 25).
24 This excludes cases where the purpose of an action is the action itself.
25 For other differences between the theories, see, for example, Harman (2000: 181–95).
26 Hutcheson (2008: 99).
27 Hutcheson (2002: 82).
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either of mind or body, all our virtues, have been derived from him, and 
must be preserved or increased by his gracious Providence” (SI I.II.XII).28 
“[I]t was God our Creator <and ruler> who implanted this sense of right 
and wrong in our souls” (SI II.I.III). “For the very kindest purposes, God 
has indeed planted a very high standard of virtue in our hearts” (SMP 
I.9.X). “God declares by the constitution of nature, by the moral faculty 
he has given us, that he espouses the cause of virtue and of the universal 
happiness” (SMP I.9.XV). “[O]ur moral sense, by the wise constitution of 
God, more approves such affections as are most useful and efficacious for 
the publick interest” (SMP II.2.II). “God…is the author of all our natu-
ral powers and dispositions, our reason, our moral faculty, and our af-
fections” (SMP II.3.VII). Hutcheson also says, “Virtue it self, or good 
Dispositions of Mind, are not directly taught, or produc’d by Instruction; 
they must be originally implanted in our Nature, by its great Author; and 
afterwards strengthen’d and confirm’d by our own Cultivation.”29 Thus, 
Hutcheson denies that virtue originates in something other than the divine, 
such as tradition, society, or culture. Considering those statements, some 
might think as follows: since the moral sense for Hutcheson already has 
a divine source, the presence of religious beliefs makes no difference in 
moral judgment in Hutcheson’s theory.
Yet, on the other hand, Hutcheson holds that we can have ideas of 
virtue and vice independently of the divine law. He says, “many have 
high Notions of Honour, Faith, Generosity, Justice, who have scarce any 
Opinions about the Deity, or any Thoughts of future Rewards; and abhor 
any thing which is Treacherous, Cruel, or Unjust, without any regard to 
future Punishments.”30 Thus, Hutcheson is against the idea that God’s re-
wards and punishments are the ground for our moral sense. I do not judge 
whether the moral sense in his theory has a divine source.
Most of the above passages by Hutcheson suggest that the Deity 
brings about positive effects on us. But elsewhere Hutcheson claims that 
“the false Opinions of the Will or Laws of the Deity” have distorted our 
moral sense, producing “Follys, Superstitions, Murders, Devastations of 
Kingdoms, from a Sense of Virtue and Duty.”31 This is how religious be-
liefs make a difference in moral judgment. In Hutcheson’s theory, false 
religious beliefs distort moral judgment.
Hume and Smith have similar views to Hutcheson’s on this point. 
Hume holds that “superstition or enthusiasm…must have the most perni-
28 Hutcheson (2007). The “I.II.XII” refers to book 1, chapter 2, section 12.
29 Hutcheson (2008: 179).
30 Hutcheson (2008: 96). See also Hutcheson (2008: 177, 181–82).
31 Hutcheson (2008: 144–45).
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cious consequences [on morality], and weaken extremely men’s attach-
ment to the natural motives of justice and humanity.”32 Smith says, “False 
notions of religion are almost the only causes which can occasion any very 
gross perversion of our natural sentiments” (TMS III.6.12). Thus, in all 
three theories, false religious beliefs can distort moral judgment.
Then some standard is necessary to identify the distortion. This stand-
ard must be different from the moral sense and moral sentiments in the 
three theories because the moral sense or moral sentiments alone can-
not recognize the distortion. If the moral sense or moral sentiments alone 
could recognize it, there would not be the distortion from the beginning. 
Thus, some external standard is necessary to identify the distortion. It 
follows that the moral sense or moral sentiments in those theories alone 
cannot identify appropriate morals even if the undistorted moral sense or 
undistorted moral sentiments can identify appropriate morals.
Let us think about stem cell research, abortion, and active euthana-
sia from a spectator’s perspective in Hutcheson’s theory. As we saw, in 
Hutcheson’s view, what is important for morality is not an action itself 
but benevolence in the action. Thus, as long as the spectator perceives be-
nevolence in stem cell research, abortion, and active euthanasia, they are 
moral. The spectator’s metaphysical beliefs do not affect his perceiving 
benevolence in those actions.
In Hutcheson’s theory, our benevolence can extend to human embryos 
being destroyed for their stem cells and to human embryos and fetuses be-
ing aborted. Hutcheson thinks it necessary “to extend our views to the 
whole Species, or to all sensitive Natures, as far as they can be affected by 
our Conduct.”33 He also says as follows: “the Perfection of Virtue consists 
in ‘having the universal calm Benevolence, the prevalent Affection of the 
Mind.’”34 “That disposition…which is most excellent, and naturally gains 
the highest moral approbation, is the calm, stable, universal good will to 
all, or the most extensive benevolence” (SMP I.4.X). Hutcheson points 
out the possibility that our benevolence extends even to “rational Agents, 
capable of moral Affections, in the most distant Planets.”35 Hutcheson up-
holds “universal Benevolence”36 as opposed to partial benevolence. He 
remarks, “All Benevolence, even toward a Part, is amiable, when not in-
consistent with the Good of the Whole: But this is a smaller Degree of Vir-
tue, unless our Beneficence be restrain’d by want of Power, and not want 
32 Hume (1998b: 124).
33 Hutcheson (2002: 125).
34 Hutcheson (2002: 8).
35 Hutcheson (2008: 114).
36 Hutcheson (2008: 127).
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of Love to the Whole.”37 It is possible to interpret the idea of the universal 
benevolence so that it extends to human embryos being destroyed for their 
stem cells and to human embryos and fetuses being aborted.
Let us think about stem cell research from the agent’s perspective in 
Hutcheson’s theory. The agent cannot conduct it with benevolence if he 
has a metaphysical belief, for example, that an embryo being destroyed 
for its stem cells is a person and therefore an object of our benevolence. If 
the agent has no metaphysical beliefs against stem cell research, he may 
conduct it with benevolence, for example, when he thinks that it will offer 
cures for many diseases and injuries of others.
Let us think about abortion from the agent’s perspective in Hutch-
eson’s theory. The agent cannot conduct it with benevolence if he has 
metaphysical beliefs, for example, that karma is the fundamental cause 
of any pain and suffering, and that the embryo, fetus, or pregnant woman 
cannot fundamentally escape pain and suffering by abortion. If the agent 
has no metaphysical beliefs against abortion, he may conduct it with be-
nevolence, for example, when he thinks that it will remove the future 
physical, relational, or economic pain and suffering of the embryo, fetus, 
or pregnant woman.
Hutcheson would not deny that the agent could conduct stem cell re-
search or abortion with benevolence. In fact, Hutcheson holds that “strange 
Crueltys practis’d toward the Aged, or Children, in certain Countrys” in 
themselves do not show the lack of benevolence. He says, “if they re-
ally be universally allow’d, look’d upon as innocent, and vindicated; it is 
certainly under some Appearance of Benevolence; such as to secure them 
from Insults of Enemys, to avoid the Infirmitys of Age, which perhaps ap-
pear greater Evils than Death, or to free the vigorous and useful Citizens 
from the Charge of maintaining them, or the Troubles of Attendance upon 
them.”38
Let us think about active euthanasia from the agent’s perspective in 
Hutcheson’s theory. The agent cannot conduct it with benevolence if he 
has a metaphysical belief, for example, that active euthanasia is against 
God’s will and brings a serious negative outcome to the patient after his 
death. If the agent has no metaphysical beliefs against active euthanasia, 
he may conduct it with benevolence, for example, when the patient seri-
ously requests it.
To sum up, in Hutcheson’s theory, answers to stem cell research, 
abortion, and active euthanasia do not change according to the spectator’s 
37 Hutcheson (2008: 126).
38 Hutcheson (2008: 139–40).
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metaphysical beliefs. Yet answers to those issues can change according to 
the agent’s metaphysical beliefs.
Hume’s theory does not work in stem cell research and abortion 
where the embryo or fetus is the receiver. According to Hume, moral ap-
proval or disapproval arises from the spectator’s sympathizing with the 
receiver’s feelings toward an action itself and its effects. Yet it is difficult 
to imagine the embryo’s or fetus’s feelings toward stem cell research or 
abortion itself and its effects. Thus, Hume’s theory does not work.
Hume’s theory may provide an answer to abortion where the preg-
nant woman is the receiver. Yet the answer can vary depending on her 
metaphysical beliefs. The woman’s feelings toward abortion itself and 
toward its possible effects can be mixed. On one hand, she has a desire 
to abort the embryo or fetus unless she is forced to do so. On the other 
hand, depending on her metaphysical beliefs, she may feel guilty about 
abortion. Suppose the woman has a metaphysical belief, for example, that 
abortion is against God’s will and she incurs punishment or compensa-
tion for it in this life, in the afterlife, or in the next life. Then she would 
feel guilty about abortion. However, if the woman has no metaphysical 
beliefs against abortion, she would not feel guilty about it. In each case, 
the spectator may sympathize with the woman’s feelings toward abortion 
itself and its possible effects.
Let us think about active euthanasia from Hume’s perspective. If the 
patient is unconscious, he has no feelings. Thus, Hume’s theory does not 
work. If the patient is conscious and has a metaphysical belief, for ex-
ample, that active euthanasia is against God’s will and brings a serious 
negative outcome to the patient after his death, he would be averse to 
active euthanasia. If the patient is conscious and has no metaphysical be-
liefs against active euthanasia, he may sincerely want active euthanasia 
to escape his physical or emotional pain. In each case, the spectator may 
sympathize with the patient’s feelings toward active euthanasia itself and 
its possible effects. Thus, Hume’s theory may provide an answer to ac-
tive euthanasia where the patient is conscious. Yet the answer can vary 
depending on the patient’s metaphysical beliefs.39
Let me note that Hume’s theory aims at producing moral judgments 
common to all people. According to him, for stable moral judgment, “we 
39 In the essay “Of Suicide,” Hume discusses suicide, which is equivalent to active 
euthanasia. There Hume regards our traditional attitude of condemning suicide as supersti-
tion, and argues that suicide “may be free from every imputation of guilt or blame.” Hume 
(1987: 580). Yet his argument does not affect the conclusion in this paragraph because as 
long as some have metaphysical beliefs against active euthanasia, it leads to the conclu-
sion.
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fix on some steady and general points of view” (T 3.3.1.15). The spectator 
must “depart from his private and particular situation, and must choose a 
point of view, common to him with others” (EPM 9.6). “’Tis only when 
a character is consider’d in general, without reference to our particular 
interest, that it causes such a feeling or sentiment, as denominates it mor-
ally good or evil” (T 3.1.2.4). In Hume’s view, “constant and universal” 
pleasures and interests “are alone admitted in speculation as the standard 
of virtue and morality. They alone produce that particular feeling or senti-
ment, on which moral distinctions depend” (T 3.3.1.30). Hume thinks that 
a moral theory is wrong if “it leads to paradoxes, repugnant to the common 
sentiments of mankind, and to the practice and opinion of all nations and 
all ages.”40 If we adopt those ideas, in abortion and active euthanasia, the 
spectator sympathizes with the pregnant woman’s or the patient’s feelings 
only when those feelings are common to all people. In other words, the 
spectator cannot make a moral judgment on abortion or active euthanasia 
when there is no common feeling toward it and its possible effects.
To sum up, Hume’s theory cannot provide answers to stem cell re-
search and abortion where the embryo or fetus is the receiver and to active 
euthanasia where the patient is unconscious. It may provide answers to 
abortion where the pregnant woman is the receiver and to active eutha-
nasia where the patient is conscious. Yet the answers can vary depending 
on the woman’s or the patient’s metaphysical beliefs. These show that the 
moral sense or moral sentiments in Hume’s theory alone cannot identify 
appropriate morals.
In Smith’s theory, moral judgment can vary depending on the agent’s 
metaphysical beliefs. According to Smith, moral approval or disapproval 
arises from our or the impartial spectator’s sympathizing or not sympathiz-
ing with the agent’s passions and motives behind his action. This means 
that, even on a same action, moral judgment can vary depending on the 
contents of the passions and motives. As we saw, the possible effects of an 
action at least sometimes shape or influence one’s passions and motives 
for the action. Thus, to find out the passions and motives, it is necessary 
to consider all the possible effects of the action from the agent’s view-
point shaped by his metaphysical beliefs. Also, the agent’s metaphysical 
beliefs may directly shape his passions and motives for an action without 
considering the effects of the action. For example, a belief that killing hu-
man embryos is morally wrong may directly be a motive for the agent’s 
opposition to stem cell research without considering the possible effects of 
the research. Thus, the agent’s passions and motives can vary depending 
40 Hume (1987: 486).
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on his metaphysical beliefs. Therefore, even on a same action, moral judg-
ment can vary depending on the agent’s metaphysical beliefs.
Let me show this by concrete examples. First, let us think about stem 
cell research. Suppose the agent has a metaphysical belief, for example, 
that stem cell research is against God’s will and the agent incurs punish-
ment or compensation for it in this life, in the afterlife, or in the next 
life. Then we or the impartial spectator would disapprove of the research. 
However, if the agent has no metaphysical beliefs against stem cell re-
search and thinks that stem cell research holds great medical promise, we 
or the impartial spectator would approve of the research. Next, let us think 
about abortion. Suppose the agent has a metaphysical belief, for example, 
that abortion is against God’s will and the agent or the pregnant woman 
incurs punishment or compensation for it in this life, in the afterlife, or in 
the next life. Then we or the impartial spectator would disapprove of abor-
tion. However, if the agent has no metaphysical beliefs against abortion, 
we or the impartial spectator may approve of abortion, for example, when 
the pregnant woman seriously requests it. Lastly, let us think about active 
euthanasia. Suppose the agent has a metaphysical belief, for example, that 
active euthanasia is against God’s will and the agent or the patient incurs 
punishment or compensation for it in this life, in the afterlife, or in the 
next life. Then we or the impartial spectator would disapprove of active 
euthanasia. However, if the agent has no metaphysical beliefs against ac-
tive euthanasia, we or the impartial spectator may approve of active eu-
thanasia, for example, when the patient seriously requests it. As we see in 
those examples, depending on the agent’s metaphysical beliefs, we or the 
impartial spectator could make even opposite moral judgments.
Smith’s theory can provide answers to stem cell research, abortion, 
and active euthanasia. But the answers can vary depending on the agent’s 
metaphysical beliefs. Thus, the moral sentiments in Smith’s theory alone 
cannot identify appropriate morals.
7. Conclusion
In all three theories, false religious beliefs can distort moral judgment. 
In Hutcheson’s theory, answers to stem cell research, abortion, and ac-
tive euthanasia do not change according to the spectator’s metaphysical 
beliefs. Yet answers to those issues can change according to the agent’s 
metaphysical beliefs. Hume’s theory cannot provide answers to stem cell 
research and abortion where the embryo or fetus is the receiver and to ac-
tive euthanasia where the patient is unconscious. It may provide answers 
to abortion where the pregnant woman is the receiver and to active eutha-
nasia where the patient is conscious. Yet the answers can vary depending 
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on the woman’s or the patient’s metaphysical beliefs. Smith’s theory can 
provide answers to stem cell research, abortion, and active euthanasia. 
But the answers can vary depending on the agent’s metaphysical beliefs. 
These show that the moral sense or moral sentiments in those theories 
alone cannot identify appropriate morals.41
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